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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by two basic concerns: 1) a concern on the
part of the Western Electric Company that some of the findings of the
Hawthorne studies, particularly those dealing with worker group behavior,
have not had a major impact on industrial relations or organizational
psychology: 2) a concern on my part that the group behavior of workers
has often been misinterpreted to be evidence against McGregor's Theory Y.
To be specific, a number of authors have attempted to argue that
because workers are often alienated from work and/or are often fundamentally
in conflict with the organization that employs them it is not possible
to apply participative theories in many kinds of situations, and by
implication therefore, Theory Y is inadequate or wrong. It is alleged
that union or other group membership limits the degree of participation
possible and makes workers unresponsive to certain kinds of management
incentives. The smart manager is advised to learn something about
inter-group conflict resolution, collective bargaining, and other power/political
strategies if he is to solve his productivity problems.
In this paper I will attmept to re-examine these various arguments,
and will attempt to show that not only is Theory Y valid and sufficient
for what it tries to do, but that most of the evidence from worker group
behavior is, in fact, in support of Theory Y. The key to this argument
will be to show 1) Theory Y is a theory of human motivation, not a
theory of how to manage or run an organization; 2) Theory Y does not
argue that human needs and organizational goals are always congruent and
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integratable, but that such integration is possible if management chooses
to make it possible; 3) Theory Y does not imply participative management
or any other kind of management -- it is only a statement about what
people are fundamentally like, and what kind of organizational behavior
they are capable of, if the conditions within the organization are appropriate
and 4) Most of the research on group behavior, including the research
on reference groups, union-management conflict, and conflict resolution
supports the Theory Y assumptions about human behavior.
Further, I will argue that where management practices have failed
to elicit a high degree of motivation and involvement from workers, it
was because of inconsistencies and conflicts within the managerial
practices themselves, not because of the resistance of workers or the
interests of unions. If management wants to reduce union-management
conflict, increase productivity and worker involvement, and elicit high
levels of commitment from workers, it is often within their power to do so,
but not without major cultural changes within the philosophies ich
govern most organizations and which puta higher premium on vat. other
than productivity and worker involvement.
I would like to re-iterate what McGregor said many years ago, that
when workers fail to exhibit behavior consistent with Theory Y assumptions
at their place of work, it is likely that they have been trained by past
management practices, organizational traditions, and control systems to
seek their involvement elsewhere, possibly in their peer groups and/or
unions, possibly in their family and/or leisure time activities. But
this does not constitute evidence for anything other than the fact that
management has not been willing to pay the price to unlock worker motivation,
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or possibly has not found it necessary to do so because adequate levels
of productivity and quality could be obtained without high levels of
worker commitment.
Why is it so important to justify Theory Y? My basic belief, based
on now 15 or more years of working with all kinds of organizations, is
that we need more Theory Y managers at all levels of organizations, but
especially at the higher levels. As organizations and technology become
more complex in response to more turbulent environments, it becomes more
and more important for managers to hold the set of assumptions about
human behavior which McGregor attempted to capture in his Theory Y
notion. In saying this, I do not mean that we need more of any given
type of managerial style or system. I am not arguing for participative
management, or delegation, or power equalization. I am arguing for the
capacity on the part of the manager to view human behavior objectively
and realistically, and to adapt the right managerial tactics according
to the dictates of the task he is facing. As I will try to show, Theory
Y gives him this flexibility because it gives him an accurate appraisal
of human beavhor. Theory X is a distortion which limits the freedom of
choice of the manager because of the limiting assumptions it makes. I
see no inconsistency between contingency theories of organization and
Theory Y because Theory Y as originally conceived is a contingency
theory.
2. What Did the Hawthorne Group Studies Show?
Let us begin by some review of the now classic Bank-Wiring room
studies which led, in a sense, to the "discovery" that worker peer
groups and cliques influenced in a substantial manner the productivity
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level, the quality level, the relationship to supervision, and the
implementation (or lack of thereof) of company policies (Roethlisberger
and Dickson, 1939, omans, 1950). To summarize briefly, let me list
some of what I consider to be the major significant findings from the
Bank-Wiring room study:
1) The workers in the room developed a group structure around the
nature of their work, the geography of the work-place, and their personalities.
This group structure operated not only on t- frmal level but began
to influence in various ways the formal routine f the group. For
example, workers traded jobs which was a specific violation of company
policy based on industrial engineering studies which argued that given
job requirements were matched with worker skill levels such that job
trading should have reduced quality. The workers undermined or sabotaged
these standards by putting pressure on the supervisors in the form of
subtly making him look bad by building difficult to find flaws into the
equipment unless he cooperated with the job trading practices.
2) The workers undermined or sabotaged the management control
system by developing their own norms of "a fair day's work for a fair
day's pay", and by creating a system of sending work out of the room
which made it appear as if the group had the desired "straight line
output" but which, in fact, resulted from storing up extra product from
days when workers felt energetic and feeding that into the system on
days when they had underproduced. This artificial creation of a straight
line output was condoned by supervision, and he obvious restriction of
output which was involved in the concept of a fair day's work was also
tolerated by managment. Indeed, it is alledged in the study that management
was, on the whole, satisfied with the productivity of the work group
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even though it was clearly below their physiological or fatigue limit.
3) Workers did not respond logically to management's incentive
system. Indeed, the productivity of individual workers had more to do
with group membership and the internal conflicts which developed between
two cliques within the room, than it had to do with individual motivation,
talent, or managerial incentives. Workers spent a lot of time pressuring
each other to live within the production norms of the group, and the
only high producers in the group were socially ostracised. Workers
spent a great deal of energy and creativity on essentially non-productive
activities, and in fact, spent energy on defeating some of the goals and
policies of management.
These kinds of findings were the first of their kind, but they have
been reproduced and documented frequently in other studies of employee
behavior. Particularly, the studies of William F. Whyte (1955) and
Chris Argyris (1957) have documented the degree to which energy is
channeled by workers into anti-management, non-productive kinds of
activities, and Dalton's classic study of management worker inter-
relations (1959) shows how the informal relations among members of the
organization are actually necessary for tasks to be accomplished. Data
such as these as well as studies of union-management conflict (Stagner,
1956), have been cited as evidence that Theory Y is an erroneous concept
of worker motivation, and that there is little hope of integrating worker
needs with organizational goals. But before we leap to that conclusion,
let us re-examine what Theory Y actually says.
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3. What Does Theory Y State?
Theory Y states, in essence, that man is capable of integrating his own
needs and goals with those of the organization; that he is not inherently
lazy and indolent; that he is by nature capable of exercising self-
control and self-direction, and that he is capable of directing his
efforts towards organizational goals. It is what McGregor called a
"cosmology", a world view, a set of assumptions about what human nature
is really like which is carried by a person inside his head. Every one
of us has our theory of what motivates people, what makes them tick,
what is their human nature. The actual behavior which we exhibit toward
people tends to be a reflection of those deep-down inner assumptions
which we make. What McGregor was seeking was an articulation of a set
of assumptions which most nearly fitted what we know about adult human
behavior, in the same sense in which Argyris articulated in his early
writings the characteristics of a mature adult (Argyris, 1957).
Let me reiterate, Theory Y is a set of assumptions about human
nature which a given person holds, consciously or unconsciously inside
his own head. It is not a managerial philosophy; it is not a management
style; it is not a property of an an organization or a management system;
it is not a set of external managerial behaviors or strategies or tactices.
It is the inner set of assumptions from which each of us derive some of
our overt behavior.
To put it in McGregor's own words:
"Theory X and Theory Y are not managerial strategies: The are underlying
beliefs about the nature of man that influence managers to adopt one
strategy rather than another. In fact, depending upon other characteristics
of the manager's view of reality and upon the particular situation in
which he finds himself, a manager who holds the beliefs that I called
Theory X could adopt a considerable array of strategies, some of which
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would be typically called "hard", and some which would be called "soft".
The same is true with respect to Theory Y." (1967, p. 79).
McGregor goes on to say that he would not change the major assumptions
stated above, but that insofar as Theory X and Theory Y are cosmolgies
which are properties of an individual person, it is possible to discover
among managers other sets of assumptions about human behavior. What
McGregor argued, however, was the Theory Y was the set of assumptions
most consistent with what we know about human behavior. I am, in turn,
arguing that this position is still correct. If one wants to identify
that set of assumptions which best fits what we know about human behavior,
Theory Y is the most nearly correct. Furthermore, McGregor did not feel
that he had created Theory X and Theory Y but that he was describing the
cosmology of effective and ineffective managers whom he encountered
in his consulting. He pointed out over and over again in his teaching
that Theory Y was a description of how effective managers viewed human
behavior.
When I attempt to get this point across in a classroom I find
myself relying on a simple tactic. I give the students two questionnaires
to fill out. One questionnaire is a set of assumptions about human
nature, derived from McGregor's writing. The respondent is asked to
indicate how much he agrees with statements such as:
1) It is only human nature for people to do as little work as they
can get away with.
2) When people avoid work, it is usually because work has been
deprived of its meaning.
3) People tend to raise their standards if they are accountable
for their own behavior and for correcting their own mistakes.
Next I give the students a second questionnaire which deals with
__ _______I_____________IL
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their own managerial behavior -- how participative they are, how much
they delegate, how much they attempt to elicit from subordinates a
degree of self-control, etc. We then score each questionnaire separately
so that each student now has two different scores to look at for himself.
One score is his Theory X-Theory Y score, his statements about his agreement
or disagreement with certain assumptions about human behavior; the
second score is his tendency to use participative types of managerial
strategies and tactics. What immediately becomes apparent to the students
is that the correspondence between the two sets of scores is far from perfect.
In fact, they tend to correlate at about the .6 level, suggesting that
if one believes in Theory Y assumptions, one tends also to believe in
participation, but that there is no necessary or automatic connection
between the two sets of concepts.
We then explore managerial situations where Theory Y managers may
want to use autocratic methods or tight control systems because 1) the
task demands it, or 2) there are time pressures, or 3) the subordinates
have lived for so long in an organization climate where they expect
autocratic methods that they would not know how to respond constructively
to participative methods, etc. We also explore the idea that the Theory
Y manager diagnoses carefully the organizational situation he finds
himself in, including the culture and climate of the organization, its
past history of management practice, the nature of this work force, the
kind of technology it has, the degree of unionization and its labor
relations history. The Theory Y manager may be predisposed toward
involving people, but there is nothing in the theory that dictates that
he must do so, nor is there any implication in the theory that participative
methods will work under all cirumstances.
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Why has there been so much confusion about this point? I believe
that McGregor himself muddied the conceptual waters when he linked to
his analysis of managerial cosmolgies a value position that it was
management's obligation to create opportunities for self-actualization.
This point comes out most clearly if we quote McGregor's original statement
from his paper "The Human Side of Enterprise." (1957, p. 15):
1. Management is responsible for organizing the elements of productive
enterprise - money, materials, equipment, people - in the interest
of economic ends.
2. People are not by nature passive or resistant to organizational
needs. They have become so as a result of experience in organizations.
3. The motivation, the potential for development, the capacity
for assuming responsibility, the readiness to direct behavior
toward organizational goals are all present in people. Management
does not put them there. It is a responsibility of management to
make it possible for people to recognize and develop these human
characteristics for themselves.
4. The essential task of management is to arrange organizational
conditions and methods of operation so that people can achieve
their own goals best by directing their own efforts toward organizational
objectivesT
In point l, McGregor clearly links management to the economic goals
of organizations. Point 2 is the essential statement of human nature
that is claimed here as being a correct statement in terms of whatever
data are available. Point 3 mixes an assumption about human nature,
with which I agree, with a value position which is articulated in the
last sentence of point 3, with which I do not agree. Point 4 is clearly
a value position which should be argued as a separate issue and should
be clearly differentiated from the assumptions about human nature.
The evidence from industrial relations research is clearly in
contradiction to a simple adoption of point 4 as a viable philosophy of
management. As Landsberger (1958), Strauss (1970), Mills (1970) and
others argue very effectively, it is often neither possible nor desirable
__· _11_·___1__1^1111__I-I___
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for management to attempt to create conditions for the integration of
individual and organizational objectives. Given McGregor's own philosophy
and utopian vision of what organizations could be, it is easy to see why
he added the value position to the theoretical position. But the fact
that he confused the issue should not blind us to the fact that he was
probably much more right about his scientific position (that it is
possible for people to achieve their own goals best through directing
their efforts toward organizational objectives) than he was about his
value position (that it is management's task to make this integration
possible across a wide variety of technologies and organizational situations).
Other variables such as those argued by organizational sociologists,
industrial relationists, and economists must be seriously considered
before one develops any particular managerial philosophy, strategy, and
tactics, whether participative or not.
My own value position which I have tried to articulate in Organizational
Psychology (1970) is that the manager must be a good situational diagnostician
and be flexible in his behavior. He must be logical and think rationally.
If he is to perceive clearly what his behavioral options are, he must
also see clearly the relationship between his assumptions about human
nature and those behavioral options. If he holds Theory X assumptions,
he is not being logical or responsive to data, and will, therefore, be
limited in his choices of managerial style. If he holds Theory Y assumptions,
he is more likely to examine the full range of alternatives available to
him and choose wisely among them, taking into account the technological,
economic, and group realities which face him. Clearly one of his options,
the one favored by Argyris (1964), Likert (1967) Herzberg (1966), Marrow
III
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et al. (1967), and others associated with participative methods and job
enrichment, is to try to arrange conditions to make it possible for his
employees to meet their needs best by linking themselves to organizational
goals. If he chooses that option, having made a thorough diagnosis of
the factors which will aid and hinder such integration, he must also
face the problem of setting into motion a major change effort which will
build the support systems necessary to make that option work*. All
too often the manager expects instant success and, if he does not get
it, assumes that his basic theory of people was wrong, rather than
questioning his own strategy and tactics of implementation.
For example, many companies have launched programs of management by
objectives or performance appraisal systems based on mutual target
setting between boss and subordinate only to find after a few years that
the paper-work was dutifully being carried out but organizational effectiveness
had not increased. The problem in most such cases is that a management
system which requires Theory Y managers is put into an organization
which has too many Theory X managers and too many autocratic or paternalistic
traditions. Such systems can only work if one starts with Theory Y
managers and changes the organization's traditions.
Given these consideration, I think one can favor the selection
and/or training of Theory Y managers, without in any way committing
oneself to a participative, or power equalization, or human relations
philosophy of management. I believe that organizations need Theory Y
managers, especially as the environmental pressures on organizations
*Such change efforts have come to be labelled "Organization Development"
and have been described in a number of recent publications (Beckhard, 1969;
Bennis, 1969; French & Bell, 1973; Schein, 1969, etc.)
_ _
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become more complex. It is then up to those managers to decide what kind
of management strategy will work best in their situation. The social
scientist should support their efforts by continuing to give them data
about what happens under varying conditions, but I would certainly argue
against any prescription (in the name of Theory Y or any other theory)
of the participative or job enrichment or self-actualization through
work kind of philosophy. Here I would align myself squa- with the
industrial relationists in arguing for contingency theo-.: and caution
in generalizing across task, industries, etc.
4. Do the Bank-Wiring Room Studies and Subsequent Research Refute Theory Y?
Now we come to a crucial logical point. If workers behave in a
demonstrably anti-organizational, anti-managerial manner as they did in
the Bank-Wiring Room, or as they do in a highly unionized conflict-ridden
industry like the automobile industry, does this mean that Theory Y
assumptions are incorrect? If workers feel more linked to external
reference groups in the community, or if they are alienated from their
work, or if they put family concerns ahead of work concerns, does this
constitute negative evidence for Theory Y? Clearly, my answer is No.
Such data do constitute negative evidence for participative management,
but they do not constitute negative evidence for Theory Y, because in
all of the situations described above, workers are energetic and involved
but usually in anti-management activities. It is not inconsistent with
Theory Y when workers expend effort to resist, sabotage, undermine, or
take advantage of management efforts if those workers feel linked to
anti-organizational peer groups, external reference groups, or are
alienated from the work itself because of technological or economic factors.
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To put it positively, workers who are expending great quantities of
energy defeating management's control systems, or workers who are sluffing
off. on their job while expending great energy on their hobbies at home,
or workers who are busy becoming leaders in.their militant union, are
all behaving consistently with Theory Y* But the organization or group
which has captured their involvement happens to be different from the
employing organization.
5. Conclusions: What Should Management Be and Do?
1) A summary model. The arguments laid out above can best be
summarized with the aid of Figure 1. My basic argument is that we must
learn to separate conceptually, the manager's assumptions about human
nature, whether he is basically Theory X or Theory Y, from his action
tendencies or style, and his actual managerial behavior.
I believe that a Theory X manager will have action tendencies to
control and limit employee behavior in terms of control systems, industrial
engineering standards, and his own sterotypes of what is good and bad
management. I believe he will be conceptually limited, inflexible, and
therefore, have a predisposition to develop autocratic or paternalitic
solutions to -management problems.
In contrast, I believe that a Theory Y manager, by virtue of
his more realistic appraisal of human nature, will have action tendencies
toward involving employees as much as the task and total situation
warrants. He will be more diagnostic in his orientation, more realistic
in his appraisal of task, time pressures, organization climate, type of
*There are, of course, immature, neurotic or psychotic individuals in the
work force who are genuinely unmotivated and indifferent across all areas
of their life to self-direction and self-actualization. Such people do
exist, but they are, by most psychological theories considered to be immature
or neurotic, hardly models on which to build any theory of healthy human behavior.
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HOW THEORY Y RELATES TO MANAGERIAL STYLE AND BEHAVIOR*
Assumptions About Human Behavior
Theory X or Theory Y
Managerial Style or Action Tendencies
Preferences for distant and aloof or
open and close relationships; narrow
and cynical or broad and realistic
view of human behavior
!, 
,I
Actual Managerial Behavior
Autocratic, tightly controlling
Paternalistic, bargaining and
controlling
Consultative, bargaining
Participative, consensual
1) Partitioned by task or
decision area
2) Political, goal related,
"industrial democracy"
Mixed Strategies
E. zernal Modifiers
1) Characteristics of task
or nature of the
decision to be made
2) Time constraints
3) Organizational norms,
structure and climate
4) Past history with given
subordinates and
accurate assessment
of their values and
group involvements
5) Economic and legal
constraints
6) Degree of stability or
turbulence of
relevant environments
of the organization
Basic conclusion: The Theory m-,anager is more likely to
and external diagnosis and con. quently choose a behavior
to the realities of the situation.
make an accurate internal
pattern that is appropriate
Internal Modifiers
I) Self-Assessment of
own motives, style,
preferences, and
limitations
2) Self-Assessment of
past experiences
with different
managerial behaviors
-
-
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subordinates he is dealing with, the reference groups and membership
groups which are operating, the legal and economic constraints in the
situation, and his own personal limitations. He will, of necessity,
consider a broader range of leadership or managerial behaviors, and will
behave in a consultative and/or participative manner only when the
situation and task warrants such behavior. He will also diagnose the
various decision or task areas he is responsible for and will probably
vary his behavior according to the diagnosis along some dimension of
participation (Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958).
Having elaborated the difference between the Theory X manager and
the Theory Y manager, I would like to restate my major conclusion:
As organizational task and enviroments become more complex and'
require more diagnosis and flexible action, organizations will
need more Theory Y managers, especially at the higher levels.
In effect, I am saying that the Contingency Theory of organizations
(e.g. Morse & Lorsch, 1970, Galbraith, 1973) is correct but that it
takes a Theory Y manager to implement it. The Theory X manager is too
limited in his diagnostic skill and too inflexible to vary his style
according to the needs of the task, etc. If we apply this conclusion back
to the Hawthorne group studies, I would argue that to manage groups in
such a way as to insure maximum productivity for the organization and
maximum security or safety from exploitation for the workers, it is
necessary to have Theory Y managers. Employees would indeed be exploited
by the Theory X managerbecause of his beliefs that the employees are out
to exploit the organization. It takes a Theory Y manager who realizes
that employee behavior is a product of past organizational history,
outside groups such as unions, occupational traditions, etc. to develop
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bargaining strategies which will be integrative rather than exploitative.
Will a Theory Y person automatically be a good manager? One might
assume from much of the above argument that holding Theory Y assumptions
about people will make one a good manger, while Theory X assumptions
about people will make one a bad manager. I am not asserting that
conclusion. I am asserting that the Theory Y person will have greater
potential for being a good manager, especially at higher and more complex
managerial jobs, but he must have the relevant training and experience
for this potential t become actual. The other side of the coin is that
the Theory X person who receives excellent management training can
probably be effective in many kinds of managerial situations but his
potential will be limited by the inflexibility of his style. But let us
be very clear that both types of people need training and experience in
being a manager before they can become effective at any level. As we
will see, however, certain kinds of developmental training such as
training in group dynamics and the management of complex, matrix situations
will be more successsful with the Theory Y person because the concepts
are more congruent with his initial assumptions.
A related question is whether it is possible for a Theory X person
to become a Theory Y person. My answer is "Yes" but only through fairly
significant growth or development experiences over a period of time.
Initial assumptions about human behavior are probably learned fairly
early in life and are taken for granted by the individual. Only when
he encounters some strong disconfirming experiences will he begin to
question is initial assumptions and begin to reassess the nature of
the reality around him. fSch initial disconfirmation happens often in
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sensitivity training where a person learns that his fellow participants
can be trusted more than he had assumed. Once such a person begins to
re-examine his work relationship and cautiously experiments with higher levels
of trust, he finds confirmation for a new point of view and moves gradually
toward more of a Theory Y orientation. But such growth experiences are
neither easy nor automatic. All I am willing to assert on the basis
of my own experience is that such growth is possible.
2) Some Concrete Applications. In order to illustrate the above
conclusions, let us examine how a Theory Y manager would deal with
certain situations especially those which are alleged to show that
Theory Y is not valid. For example, Mills (1970) points out that when
several units of a company or several companies are dealing with a
single national union that is attempting to apply a coordinated strategy,
the employees of a given plant or company may be asked to continue
a strike even though the local labor-management relations at that plant
might not warrant it. There is little that the management of that plant
can then do to improve relations, since the employees are constrained by
their dual loyalties to the company as well as the union. In this
situation, I believe that a Theory X manager would probably become
angry, feel that the continued strike was proof of his cyncial view of
human nature, and set about to increse management controls in order to
weaken the union. The Theory Y manager, facing the same situation,
would understand the dilemma of double loyalty and his employees' decision
to strike. He would understand that they had, in effect, no choice,
would not become angry or cynical, but would set about to work out a
realistic plan with his own employees which would minimize the long-
range negative impact of the strike on his own plant. He would reassure
_I_ _1_1 _IIYs
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his employees that he understood their position and would put his energies
into dealing with the national union (the outside group) rather than
trying to undermine or weaken his own employees' union commitments.
Mills also argues:
The view that true employee participation can occur only in the
union context stems from the belief that only where a labor organization
exists is an employee able to participate without fear of reprisal from
management...Only freedom from arbitrary dismissal or other denial
of privileges can make the employee at all independent... An employee,
protected by a set of rules and due process, is believed to be a
free man in the industrial framework." (Mills, 1970, p. 5)
The employee is indeed unsafe from a Theory X manager because of the
manager's cynical view of the employee's motivation*. A Theory Y manager
would recognize that employees need due process and would strengthen
those parts of the contract which provided the necessary safeguards and
protection. lie would set about to build up trust levels which would
make it possible for employees toparticipate in those decisions areas
where they have a genuine input and stake in the decision.
Plant managers who are strongly Theory Y in their personal beliefs
and who want to stimulate a climate of greater trust have been able to
do so over a period of time even with strong and initially cynical
unions. The result is not that the union goes away or is weakened, but
that the time needed to reach an agreement through collective bargaining
is dramatically shortened. Once there is a degree of mutual trust, the
*The data from the Bank-Wiring Room are a perfect example of what happens when
mutual mistrust arises between workers and managers. Management creates a set
of rules and controls to minimize the negative impact of what is presumed to
be the worker's tendency to be lazy (Theory X). The worker responds by defeating
the rules and controls of management as a self-protective device because he mistrusts
management -- the workers believed that if they produced more, the piece work
rate would be cut, even though none of them had any first hand experience of such
cuts in the past.
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uniol is still there but the dealings with the union take on more of a
problem solving character instead of hostile bargaining between enemies.
Once the problem solving climate has been established, it is possible
for the union and management to look for integrative solutions. In this
kind of context, the Theory Y manager seeks to strengthen the union
since he recognizes the need for it, and welcomes the problem solving
process which collective bargaining makes possible. Once the employee
learns that both managementand his union are attempting to do what is
best for everyone concerned, there is less need for the kind of self-
protection which the workers in the Bank-Wiring Room exhibited. Is this
utopian? Possibly, but I know of enough examples from my own consulting
experience to know that one can think of improving the industrial relations
climate markedly, if one finds Theory Y managers to run plants and to
negotiate with workers.
Mills' assumption that the worker: "...is likely to limit his
'participation' to what he thinks his supervisor would like to hear"
(Mills 1970, p. 6) is probably correct in the kind of climate which is
typically established by Theory X managers but it is not inherent in the
labor-management context. I would agree with Mills that: "In general,
the process of participative management is more difficult and complex
than as been recognized." (Mills, 1970, p. 6), partly because of the
danger that management, in its efforts to reward participation weill give
in too much on issues of efficiency. But there is nothing in Theory Y
that says one has to give in. Rather, the Theory Y manager would assert
that a worker is capable of understanding and accepting the economic
constraints which operate in a business and which force managment to
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seek a high degree of efficiency and effectiveness. But the manager must
not only have the faith that the worker can understand and accept such
constraints, he must also make the effort to think it through clearly
and communicate his logic clearly to the worker. All too often, the
manager is not clear in his own mind why he will not go along with a
particular union demand, or will not make the effort to explain to the
union why the company cannot afford a particular benefits package or pay
raises. Part of the reason may be that management has not seen fit to
educate the workers in the economic realities of their particular company,
partly because they operate too much on Theory X assumptions. The
Theory Y manager would lay the groundwork by educating workers in the
economics of the industry, and would find it easier to argue against unrealisitic
demands from unions, because the criteria of what is realistic would be
jointly shared between labor and management.
Participative management can be a fraud and fraught with dangers
for the workers, as Mills points out, but only when participation is
practiced by Theory X managers who are looking for a way to defraud
their workers. The Theory Y manager would not undertake a particpative
program in the first place unless he could see overall gains for both
the company and the workers. So it does little good to argue about the
merits or demerits of participation per se. What I am arguing is that
whether or not it works and whether or not is is safe for the worker to
participate has much more to do with the nature of the industry and the
task, and has much more to do with the manager's assumptions about human
nature -- whether he is a Theory X or Theory Y kind of manager.
What if a company is operating in an industrial relations climate
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where strong trade unions consistently undermine productivity by limiting
what the employee can work on? If such a company has Theory Y managers
at its toplevels, it can set out to change the total climate by working
with the trade unions at a national level. One large industrial conglomerate
which decided that its total survival depended upon changing its basic
relationship with its unions, nation-wide, launched a 20 year change
program which involved simultaneous programs at the national level aimed
at changing relations with the national offices of the union, massive
efforts to find more Theory Y managers for the major plants, large scale
change programs to examine the pro's and con's of more partcipation at
the shop floor level on a plant by plant basis, education programs for
all levels of plant mangement, a new incentive scheme more consistent
with the changing goals of the company, trial sites and research evaluations
of pilot aspects of the program and many other separate activities.
Clearly if a company decides it is important enough, there is much that
it can do to overcome an unfavorable industrial relations climate.
If such programs fail, it is often because the task workers are
asked to perform is technologically meaningless an/or frustrating,
leading to alienation and the organization of defensive counter-organizational
groups. Giving workers a "sense" of participation in inherently meaningless
work would only be thought of by a Theory X manager.
The Theory Y manager, in that type of situation, would not use
particpative methods because he would recognize that in the long run
workers would become angry over phony participation and would then group
together against him. Instead, he would acknowledge that the situation
was inherently non-involving and would undertake to assess the costs and
._- -----------~---I
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benefits of a change in the technology. If the economic realities
preclude changing the technology (as may be the case in the auto industry),
the Theory Y manager would "level" with his employees and would accept
their demands for higher pay or fringe benefits to compensate them for
the inherently meaningless work. He would consult them around how to
make the plant more human, but he would acknowledge frankly the economic
facts which would make a change in the task technology impossible. The
Theory X manager sometimes falls into the trap .of wanting his cake and
eating it too. He wants worker motivation without creating a task which
permits involvement. Asking workers to participate in tasks which do not
permit involvement is simply self-defeating, and the Theory X manager is
more likely to fall into this trap because of his lack of diagnostic
skill and lack of action flexibility.
Theory Y and Group Dynamics. Many critics of the human relations
movement, participative management, and by implication Theory Y, argue
that inter-group conflict within the organization (e.g. union-management
conflict, inter-departmental conflict, etc.) are not only inevitable but
can be a productive force both for employees and management. Out of the
inherently different interests of different groups can come new ideas
and new solutions to problems.
Strauss put is this way:
"There is general agreement that, on occasion, conflict can be very
useful to organizations both as a means of bringing issues to top
management's attention which might otherwise be ignored and as a
form of competition within the firm which serves as a substitute
for that of the market place. The trick is how to handle such
conflict so that it remains productive. (1970, p. 179)
Strauss goes on to review the work of Landsberger, Whyte, Sayles, Walton,
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Lawrence and Lorsch, all of whom deal with lateral conflicts as an
inevitable aspect of organization, and as something which can be made
productive for the organization.
The main problem with the analysis is that it fails to distinguish
task or work related conflict (which implies highly involved employees
competing to implement their view of what is best for the total organization)
from inter-group or inter-individual conflict based on personal power
needs, representing the interest of outside groups or needs for self-
protection from higher levels of mangement.
A Theory Y manager is prepared to deal with task related conflict
and to seek integrative solutions provided the organization is prepared
to adjust work flows, organization structure, etc. to permit-the solution
to be implemented. The Theory X manager assumes that conflict is always
motivated politically and selfishly, and therefore seeks to bargain his
way out of it rather than even considering integrative solutions. In
other words, the tactics of conflict resolution used by the manager will
be related to their assumptions about people, as Blake has shown in
analysing the conflict resolution styles of his different "grid" types
(Blake and Mouton, 1964). The production oriented, 9,1, manager tends
to suppress conflict or simply decide one way or the other. The abdicating
1,1 or compromsing 5,5 manager tends to try to compromise by mutual
bargaining or to avoid recognizing it in the first place. The 1,9 manager
gives in to worker pressure. Only the 9,9 manager, the one who would,
in McGregor's terminology, be a Theory Y person, attempts to find integrative
solutions because he believes that each party to the conflict is acting
in good faith. Blake's ability to adapt Sherif's inter-group conflict
resolution model into successful strategies around labor-management
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issues, inter-functional issues, inter-divisional issues, and merger/acquistion
issues testified to the correctness of those assumptions (Blake and
Mouton, 1964, Sherif 1956). But it takes a skilled Theory Y manager to
implement the Blake conflict resolution model.
All of the above points imply a degree of diagnostic skill in
handling groups and handling conflict situation. I have argued that
the Theory Y manager is more likely to be able to learn these skills
than the Theory X manager. It has been my observation that most manay .s,
whether X or Y, lack group dynamics skill to a significant degree.*
This lack of skill shows up in mismanaged staff meetings, underproductive
committees, conflict ridden task-forces and project teams, and mis-
managed inter-group relations. Clearly, having Theory Y assumptions
does not make one an expert in handling group situations, but one needs
Theory Y assumptions in order to believe in groups in the first place
(Schein, 1970). The Theory Ymanager is more likely to recognize that
groups are a fact of life to be dealt with and managed. As the examples
above have tried to show, he will accept the reality of dual loyalties
in his employees and will accept the realities of inter-functional or
inter-divisional conflict within his organization. He will analyze the
costs and benefits of such conflict and then will need group skills to
either manage the conflict productively or to create a reward system
which reduces the conflict in the first place. He will recognize that
conflict is not inevitable, but the result of how groups and individuals
are managed. He will know when conflict is productive (in task areas)
*An increasing amount of my consultation work with managers and management
teams is focusing on the management of meetings, groups, teams, task-forces,
etc., teaching line managers how to be better "process consultants" (Schein, 1969).
-24-
and when it is destructive (in inter-personal areas)*.
We have enough examples such as the Scanlon Plan, wartime economies,
Alfred Marrow's two companies, some of the plants in Proctor and Gamble
and General Foods, recent experiments within Western Elelctric, the team
production experiences in the aircraft industry and, more recently in
Volvo, to know that it is possible for groups to work with and for the
organization that employs them. But it takes Theory Y managers to use
them productively, and it takes tasks and organizational conditions that
make such group involvement possible and productive. Let us, once and
for all recognize that Contingency Theories, and Industrial Relations
theories are consistent with and complementary to Theory Y,. and put
behind us the conceptual confusion which has muddied this field for so long.
*Theory X Managers who learn group dynamics skills often come across as
stilted and phoney, manipulative and eventually lose their support of their group.
~~- -~- ~ ~  l--^ ~ -s llara ^-· ~ -aa rra ~ ~ ·-- - _~- ---- --
III
REFERENCES
Argyrts, C., Personality and Organization, New York: Harper, 1957.
Argyris, C., Integr_atin the ndividual and the ()ranization, New York:
Wiley, 1964.
Beckhard, R., Oranization Development: Strategies and Models, Reading, Mass:
Addison-Wesley, 1969.
Bennis, W.G., Organization Development: Its Nature, Origin and Prospects,
Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1969.
Blake, R.R. and Mouton, J.S., The Managerial Grid, Houston: Gulf Publications, 1964.
Dalton, M., Men Who Manage, New York: Wiley, 1959.
French, W.L. and Bell, C.H., Organization Development, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Galbraith, J., Designing Complex Organizations, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1973.
Herzberg, F., Work and the Nature of Man, New York: World, 1966.
)lomnns, (:.C., The Human (rot!p, New York: 1iarcourt, Brace & World, 1950.
Kelly, J., Organizational Behaviour: An Existential-Systems Approach, Rev. Ed.,
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1974.
Landsberger, H.A., Hawthorne Revisited, Ithaca, New York: New York State School
of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1958.
Likert, R., The Human Organization, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
Marrow, A.J., Bowers, D.C. and Seashore, S.S., Management by Participation,
New York: Harper, 1967.
M-Gregor, D. "The Human Side of Enterprise", Leadership and Motivation, Cambridge,
Mass: The MIT Press, 1966.
MkGregor, D., The Professional Manager, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
~M11s, D.Q.,"Industrial Relations and the Theory of Human Resources Management,"
Sloan Management Review, 1970, 12, pp. 1-14.
Mbrse, J. & Lorsch, J.W.,"Beyond Theory Y", Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1970,
pp. 61-68.
Roethlisberger, F.J. & Dickson, W.J, Management and the Worker, Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1939.
Schein, E.H.,Process Consultation: Its Role in Organizational Development, Reading,
Mass: Addison-Wesley Co., 1969.
Schein, E.H.,Organizationai Psychology, 2d ed.,Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1970.
Sherif, M.,"Experiments on Group Conflict and Cooperation", Scientific American
1956, vol. 195, pp. 54-58.
REFERENCES (Con't)
Stagner, R., The Psychology of Industrial Conflict, New York: Wiley, 1956.
Strauss, G.,t"Organizational Behavior and Personnel Relations", A Review of Industrial
Relations Research, 1970, 1, pp. 145-206.
Tannenbaum, R., & Schmidt, H.W.,"How to Choose a Leadership Pattern"', Harvard
Business Review, March-April, 1958.
Whyte, W.F.,Money and Motivation, New York: Harper, 1955.
_
